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TECHNOLOGICAL TYING: THE MICROSOFT SAGA 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPEAN UNION
This Article deals with a concept of technological tying under competition law of 
the European Union and antitrust rules of the United States. It analyzes the approaches 
taken by the competition authorities and courts on either side of the Atlantic through 
the example of Microsoft cases. As will be shown, the approaches differ significantly, 
focusing on diverse elements of the practice in question and conversely assessing some 
of them. The author concludes that neither of the approaches is free of shortcomings, 
insisting on the necessity of a more balanced and progressive approach toward the 
practice that perfectly reflects the evolution of competitive behavior of the dominant 
undertakings in step with technological progress.
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Дараган В. Технологічне нав’язування продуктів: сага Майкрософт в 
Сполучених Штатах Америки та Європейському Союзі. – Стаття.
Стаття присвячена концепції технологічного нав’язування продуктів відпо-
відно до конкурентного законодавства Європейського Союзу та антимонополь-
них правил Сполучених Штатів Америки. В статті аналізуються підходи анти-
монопольних органів та судів по обидві сторони Атлантики на прикладі справ 
Майкрософт. Як буде показано, підходи суттєво різняться, приділено увагу різним 
елементам розглянутої практики та протилежно оцінено деякі з них. Автор зазна-
чає, що жоден з підходів не позбавлений недоліків, та наполягає на необхідності 
більш збалансованого та прогресивного підходу до практики, яка яскраво відобра-
жає еволюцію конкурентних практик відповідно до технологічного прогресу. 
Ключові слова: технологічне нав’язування продуктів, Майкрософт, інтегра-
ція продуктів, домінуюче положення. 
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Дараган В. Технологическое навязывание продуктов: сага Майкрософт в 
Соединённых Штатах Америки и Европейском Союзе – Статья.
Статья посвящена концепции технологического навязывания продуктов в 
соответствии с конкурентным законодательством Европейского Союза и антимо-
нопольными правилами Соединенных Штатов Америки. В статье анализируются 
подходы антимонопольных органов и судов по обе стороны Атлантики на при-
мере дел Майкрософт. Как будет показано, подходы существенно различаются, 
уделяется внимание различным элементам рассматриваемой практики и противо-
положно оцениваются некоторые из них. Автор отмечает, что ни один из подходов 
не лишен недостатков, и настаивает на необходимости более сбалансированного и 
прогрессивного подхода к практике, которая ярко отражает эволюцию поведения 
доминирующих компаний в соответствии с технологическим прогрессом.
Ключевые слова: технологическое навязывание продуктов, Майкрософт, 
интеграция продуктов, доминирующее положение. 
Many small undertakings would not object to reaching a position of 
dominance. However, such a position may result in additional responsibility 
and certain risks, that are not likely to arise for companies with a lower 
market power. Naturally, sometimes dominant undertakings attempt to 
benefit from their own position in such a way, that either inevitably or with 
a high degree of certainty harms competition. Such conduct of dominant 
firms can often be considered an abuse of a dominant position.
Abusive behavior can take various forms, such as predatory pricing, 
loyalty rebates, refusal to deal, bundling and tying practices. However, 
the concept of tying appears to be the one that evolved through the years, 
keeping step with technological progress and the most recent developments 
in the IT sphere. The introduction of personal computers has created an 
outsized market, accessible for new players. Needless to say, the tightness 
of competition, as well as the level of control in the market, has changed 
dramatically over recent years. Thanks to advent of personal computers 
and, in the course of time, of the Internet, the new forms of abusive behavior 
came into being. As we will see further, technological tying turned out to be 
way more complex than the classical, contractual tying. However, popular 
quotation of one of forefathers of Chicago School of antitrust analysis, 
Robert Bork [1, p. 378], concerning the imposition of tying arrangements 
by every seller is still valid and applicable to technological tying, as well. 
Definition of “tying” can be generalized as the “legal concept which 
occurs when the purchase of product A (tying product) is conditional upon 
the purchase of product B (tied product)” [2, p. 7]. It should be noted, 
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that only one of those products is available separately. To a great extent, 
this condition draws a line between the concepts of tying and bundling. 
The latter always refers either to the situation where two distinct products 
cannot be purchased separately, or where both products are available 
individually, but a bundle provides for a lower price. 
The particular concept in issue, technological tying, involves an 
integration of one product into another product. As a result, two products 
constitute a single one, potentially containing an additional functionality. 
Therefore, elimination of integrated product frequently affects an 
effectiveness and, therefore, value of the entire product [3, p. 27].
In the European Union (hereinafter – the EU), the technological tying 
is included in the category of tying in general, and falls within the scope 
of article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
(hereinafter – the TFEU) [4].
As a result of the influence of the Chicago School, the European 
Commission admits that product tying has always been a common practice 
for both dominant and non-dominant undertakings and that often it does 
not lead to the negative consequences for competition. Moreover, there 
is also no objection raised in regard of possible advantages not only for 
the undertakings (e.g. savings in production, distribution and transaction 
costs) but more importantly for the clients (e.g. better quality and/or lower 
price of products) [5]. However, as opposed to the possible efficiencies of 
tying arrangements, one shall not completely exclude the potential negative 
effects of the practice concerned, such as foreclosure of competition, price 
discrimination and higher prices [5]. For this reason, thorough and complex 
analysis is absolute necessary in each individual case in order to adequately 
assess an impact of the tying on the clients and market situation, especially 
when it concerns the technological market. 
The EC has developed a four-part test for establishing the violation of 
Article 102 by means of tying arrangements, which was later confirmed by 
by the General Court’s decision in Microsoft I case [6].
First, the four-part test requires tying and tied goods to be separate 
products. At this stage, the Commission applies two simple tests in order 
to check whether the products are actually distinct or not: the demand test 
and the supply test [7, p. 3].
Secondly, the undertaking concerned shall hold a position of dominance 
in the market of the tying product. It should be noted that regardless of the 
firm’s position in the market, if it is not able to provide consumers with the 
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core and expected functionality, the firm can find itself in rather unequal 
position comparing to its competitors. Consequently, such situation may 
be highly beneficial for rivals, but not necessarily beneficial for consumers 
and competition at large (to certain extent, the issue of functionality and 
consumers’ expectations is addressed in the next, third, step of the test). 
Hence, an attitude of competition authorities toward technological tying 
should not be based on the position of the undertaking concerned whether 
it is dominant or not. 
Third, there shall be no opportunity provided by the undertaking to 
customers to purchase the tying product without the tied product. For 
instance, in Microsoft I, the General Court refused to consider the fact, 
that Microsoft did not charge extra price for additional functionality, 
neither did it impose on consumers an obligation to use the functionality. 
Moreover, and this element is also utterly important for the last step of the 
test, Microsoft did not impose on end users any limitations concerning the 
additional or exclusive use of the software manufactured by Microsoft’s 
rivals [6, r. 806]. Also, OEMs were not prevented from installing third-
party media streaming software in addition to WMP.
Finally, the tying arrangement shall foreclose the competition [6, r. 794]. 
It is noteworthy, that for the last condition to be met, there is no need to 
show the existing effect, if the tie is capable of foreclosing competition.
In Microsoft I, the Commission came up with three arguments proving 
the existence of foreclosure effect. First, WMP had unrivaled omnipresence 
on client PC globally. Such a position was easily achieved due to the fact 
that the number of Windows client PC users corresponded to the number 
of WMP users [8, r. 843-879]. Second, complementary content providers 
relied mostly on the WMP format. This argument was based on the “indirect 
network effects” theory, that is the more users choose given software, the 
more investments would be made in new products consistent with that 
software, in such a manner increasing its popularity [8, r. 879-899]. The 
third reason is that market analyses indicated the tendency of usage of 
WMP to the prejudice of the other media players [8, r. 900-944].
Although the Microsoft II case, initiated three years after, never 
made it to the Court, the EC applied the same four-part test with regard 
to the integration of Internet Explorer into Windows operating system. 
Moreover, the Commission adopted a very similar, if not identical, theory 
of harm to consumers and competitors in both cases. More particularly, the 
Commission relied on the concept of coercion as a result of tying, producing 
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anticompetitive effects by way of not providing computer manufacturers and 
eventually end users with the possibility of purchasing Windows without 
Windows Media Player or Internet Explorer. Moreover, it was assumed that 
since technological markets are characterized by network effects, Microsoft 
was able to use its dominant position in the market of operating systems 
to bring the products, namely WMP and IE, on the same level of ubiquity 
by means of tying the products to Windows and using it as a distribution 
channel. Finally, for the same reason the Commission states that Microsoft 
was enabled to leverage its dominance abusively created in the other 
markets (media players market and web browsers market accordingly) to 
neighboring markets, as both WMP and IE are undoubtedly considered as 
software platforms for web content and applications correspondingly. In such 
a manner, in the Commission’s view, the content and application developers 
were motivated to create content and applications for WMP and IE above all 
others. Hence, the structure of competition was distorted and innovation in 
the web and media was stifled [9, p. 120]. 
The approach of the European Commission and the General Court 
appeared to be inconsistent with the development of IT industry due to 
several reasons. Both the EC and the General Court to some extent failed to 
carry out a complex analysis of the Microsoft’s conduct and its impact on 
the consumers and competition. Instead, an increased focus was put on the 
position of the Microsoft’s rivals. Even though the Commission’s concerns 
were mostly addressed to the potential foreclosure of competition, the 
assumptions were not economically justified. Furthermore, the Microsoft’s 
justifications were not correctly assessed and therefore were not accepted 
by either the EC and the General Court.
Microsoft I and Microsoft II have been highly discussed due to many 
reasons but mostly because of the divisiveness and unusualness by which 
both cases can be characterized. To a large extent, they could not have been 
correctly assessed in comparison with any other case, therefore creating 
some kind of a unique precedent in competition jurisprudence. However, 
the Commission sent a statement of objections to Google in April 2016, 
ascribing to the American technology giant, inter alia, the practice similar 
to the one used by Microsoft. In substance, it means that now Microsoft 
cases may serve, for better or worse, as a certain standard to rely on in 
Google investigation.
In contrary, the position of the U.S. courts and antitrust authorities is 
fairly favorable for dominant undertakings involved in technological tying. 
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Historically, the American antitrust jurisprudence has been influenced by 
two widely different legal doctrines, namely Harvard and Chicago Schools. 
In the course of time, a predominance of the former gave way to more 
flexible ideas originated in the University of Chicago. One of the underlying 
concepts of the Chicago School is that the focus of antitrust should be on the 
protection of consumers by means of stimulation of higher production, better 
quality, faster innovation and lower prices [1, p. 378]. Thus, the Chicago 
School opposed to the protection of competitors as a reasonable objective of 
the antitrust policy [1, p. 50]. It serves as a rationale behind the idea that if 
the competitors are less efficient and thus lose opportunities, it is actually not 
a bad thing, but quite the opposite [10, p. 4]. The area of tying seems to be 
the last outpost of the Harvard School, although it should be noted that the 
U.S. courts nevertheless accept certain efficiencies deriving from the tying 
practices. However, as it will be shown below, in technological tying cases 
the U.S. courts tend to rely on the considerations of technological progress, 
thus allowing technological integration of the products. 
In the US legislation, the issue of tying is addressed in section 1 of the 
Sherman Act [11].
Considering the complexity of the technological tying, it comes with 
a little surprise, that one of the most notable U.S. antitrust cases involved 
the largest player in the technologically dynamic market of operating 
systems and its practice of product integration. The Microsoft cases may 
serve as an illustrative example of how the courts have dealt with the issue 
product integration. As described below, the courts may surprisingly put 
an emphasis on different aspects and assess the same practice from the 
opposite points of view.
The reasoning, formed by the judges and economists, played a key role 
in Microsoft II case in 1997. At the time, the Department of Justice (the 
“DOJ”) accused Microsoft of both contractual and technological tying 
of IE (version 3.0 and 4.0) to Windows 95 operating system, which, in 
the DOJ’s opinion, was contrary to the consent decree concluded with 
Microsoft in 1995. Essentially the Windows 95 OS and Internet Explorer 
could be obtained only on the same disk, and the installation of web browser 
was required in order for the operating system to function [12, p. 940-941]. 
Moreover, the browser uninstallation would lead to deactivation of the 
operating system. Eventually the tie changed into contractual in substance, 
since Microsoft made a purchase of IE 4.0 compulsory for the licensing 
of Windows 95 to OEMs. As a result, OEMs were obliged to license, 
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pre-install, and distribute the IE together with the Windows OS. Microsoft 
in its defense argued that it introduced an ‘integrated product’, meaning 
that every time Microsoft added a function to the OS it was developing a 
new product [12].
Contrary to the DOJ’s position, the Court of Appeals did not find 
a violation of the decree. Instead, the court interpreted it in a way that 
provided for an explicit exemption for integrated products [3, p. 950-951]. 
The court also defined an “integrated product” as the one that “combines 
functionalities (which may also be marketed separately and operated 
together) in a way that offers advantages unavailable if the functionalities 
are bought separately and combined by the purchaser. The court found 
that combination, for instance, of Windows 95 and Netscape’s browser 
would not produce benefits equal to the ones produced by combination of 
Windows OS and IE. The court had no other choice but to admit a beneficial 
nature of the tie, considering that it was indeed an integration of products 
advantageous for consumers, not merely a tying arrangement designed to 
harm the competition [13, p. 953].
The last finding was based on rather simple test. In fact, the test provided 
that combination “must be different from what the purchaser could create 
from the separate products on his own” and the combined form must “be 
better in some respect” [13, p. 949]. Such a narrow approach may be 
explained by the limited competence of courts to assess high-tech product 
designs and the high cost of error [13, p. 950]. Microsoft quite easily 
met both requirements of the test. For the first part, although consumers 
had a possibility to obtain products separately, Microsoft combined the 
two in a way that created a design bringing together the functionalities 
of the distinctive products. With regard to the second part of the test, the 
integration improved browsing and non-browsing functionalities of the 
operating system [13, p. 952].
The court’s reasoning confirms its rather deliberate position. Indeed, 
such a position was necessary in order to avoid the risk of dangerous 
mistake that could be possibly disadvantage the consumers by preventing 
them from obtaining the operating system with a web browser pre-installed. 
At the time, it was rightfully presumed that the given decision will create 
a valuable precedent for future technological tying cases. However, the 
Microsoft III case casted doubt on that assumption. 
Just one year later, in 1998, a new antitrust suit against Microsoft was 
filed by the DOJ and a group of nineteen state plaintiffs [14]. This time, 
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Microsoft was accused of use of four different anticompetitive practices 
falling within the scope of two categories, namely 1) unlawful tying and 
unlawful exclusive dealing arrangements (violating Art. 1 of the Sherman 
Act); 2) unlawful monopoly maintenance and attempted monopolization 
(violating Art. 2 of the Sherman Act).
Concerning the violations under section 1, the court found Microsoft 
liable for tying, however rejected the claim of exclusive dealing. In its 
conclusions, the court found that Microsoft had a monopoly in PC 
operating systems market, had illegally imposed tying arrangements and 
entered into exclusionary contracts in order to remove its rival, Netscape, 
from the browser market, and had engaged in number of other actions in 
an effort to maintain its monopoly in the aforesaid market and aimed at 
monopolization of the browser market [14]. In the court’s opinion, the 
tie induced OEMs not to pre-install competing browsers and therefore 
discouraged consumers from using them.
Explaining his decision to deviate from the rule established by 
D.C. Circuit in Microsoft II, Judge Jackson pointed out two reasons. First, 
since Microsoft II was based on the alleged violation of a consent decree, 
he considered Microsoft II to be a non-antitrust case to some extent but 
rather the case about contractual intent [14]. Consequently, from Judge 
Jackson’s perspective, Microsoft II decision was not intended to constitute 
a controlling rule of law for the present case. Second, Judge Jackson 
affirmed that an understanding of product integration in Microsoft II 
decision contradicted the Supreme Court precedents in three ways. In 
Microsoft II, the market was viewed from the perspective of defendant 
instead of consumer’s point of view, as established in Jefferson Parish. 
Further, the approach taken by the court in Microsoft II did not require 
the defendant’s claim of advantage from the integration of products to be 
proved. Finally, the genuine-technological-integration test did not make a 
comparison between any theoretical advantages of the integration and any 
anticompetitive effects [14].
The D.C. Circuit found itself in position when the rational of the relevant 
precedent of the Supreme Court conflicted with the current economic 
theory [15]. Having taken into account the ideas suggested by current 
economic theory, the court affirmed prospective transaction-cost savings 
and economies of scale or scope resulted from the tying practices [13, p. 34, 
87]. The court also stated that the test established in Jefferson Parish was 
not always capable of distinguishing procompetitive and anticompetitive 
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tie-ins. In view of this, the court deviated from the traditional per se 
approach in tying cases and therefore overruled the district court’s decision 
that tying of IE to Windows by Microsoft was illegal. As a consequence, the 
D.C. Circuit introduced a new rule for tying cases “involving platform 
software products”, holding that such cases should be assessed under a “rule 
of reason”. In accordance with rule of reason, in order to find Microsoft 
liable for imposition of illegal tying arrangement, the plaintiffs would have 
to show that negative effects on competition outweighed the procompetitive 
explanations offered by Microsoft. Moreover, they were also expected to 
show evidence proving that Microsoft’s conduct “unreasonably restrained 
competition”. However, the government decided not to pursue the tying 
claim on remand. Such a decision may hardly be surprising considering 
the high level of standards for finding tying violations established by the 
appeals court.
As has been seen, the U.S. courts indeed have more experience in dealing 
with technological tying. In addition, the Chicago School weighed in a lot on 
the issue of technological tying and such influence could not be completely 
ignored by the courts. However, it should be noted that the Law and 
Economics school also influenced the policy of the European Commission 
and EU courts, even though it took way more time than in the case of their 
U.S. colleagues. More particularly, the Chicago School convinced judges 
and lawyers, as well as many other economists, on either side of the Atlantic 
that competition policy must be only concerned with the goal of maximizing 
efficiency [16, p. 64]. As a result, this special attention was adopted in a 
form of “rule of reason” test in the U.S. and latterly in a form of the “effect-
based” approach in the EU. Moreover, the position of the U.S. courts has 
evolved over the years since 1970s, whereas the EU courts and competition 
authorities first faced the technological tying quite recently. 
In the light of the foregoing, it is becoming clear that the approach 
taken by the European Commission and the General Court is inconsistent 
with the particular qualities of the technologically developing markets, 
such as computer industry in general, but more specifically the operating 
systems market and applications market. More particularly, both the EC 
and the General Court ignore the essential difference between tying of 
ordinary products and integrated software. Even though the Commission 
recognizes a need for economic considerations in assessment of the tying 
arrangements, it however fails to duly take into account the core economic 
differences between traditional and technological tying. 
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In substance, the tests developed by the EC and later supported by the 
General Court gave rise to many questions concerning each step of the 
test. It appears that the Commission interprets technological tying in a way 
that does not offer a chance for the opposing party to justify its conduct, 
whatever the arguments it may come up with.
Moreover, it is excessively focused on protection of competitors of the 
dominant undertaking involved in tying, thus ignoring the benefits that 
product integration may bring to the consumers. Consequently, not only is 
the current position of European authorities to certain extent unfavorable 
for consumers, but also capable of slowing down a technological progress 
in IT industry.
In this regard, the experience of the U.S. courts may be of vital 
importance. The rule of reason test, adopted instead of traditional per se 
rule, provides for comparison of efficiencies produced by tying against 
the reduction of consumers’ possibility to choose products and potential 
negative impacts on competition in the market concerned. It demonstrates 
the fundamental difference in perception of tying in the U.S. and EU. 
However, this approach is neither free from shortcomings. The reason is 
that it does not provide comprehensive guidance for the courts to assess 
the practice in question and therefore the judges can find it rather difficult 
to correctly balance the benefits and adverse effects. For this reason, 
software manufacturers cannot possible know the exact rules of the game 
and therefore can be entrapped between the possibility to be accused in 
unlawful practice and feat to introduce innovate and valuable bundles. As 
a result, although this approach is more progressive, it nonetheless fails to 
address all the issues arising out of technological tying. 
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